Summary on Venezuela 12
Enrique ter Horst
11 June 2007,on travel in Europe
Charisma, money and an attempt to meticulously safeguard the formal trappings of democracy – a task that is fast becoming next to impossible – no longer seem to be enough to steer Venezuela towards a totalitarian society. By grossly underestimating the intelligence and democratic convictions of both his countrymen and the governments of Latin America, Chavez has managed in less than six months to squander the very considerable political capital he had accumulated over the last eight years. His dismal domestic record, characterized by insecurity, disinvestment, scarcity, inflation, and billions spent on buying arms and international allegiances is now, after his arbitrary decision to close RCTV, squarely blamed on him alone, not any longer on his ministers. His inability, after 8 years in power, to satisfy the huge expectations he had generated with the poor has led to the disillusionment of a very large part of his political base.
The government was surprised by the very large student demonstrations ignited by the RCTV shut-down, as was almost everybody else. Their motto is Libertad and they call for national reconciliation, announcing that their movement will remain active until RCTV renews its transmissions and the government cancels its plans to control the universities. A movement of peaceful resistance, tear gassing and pelleting the students only gave them global prominence. Chavez now treats them with silk gloves, but still accuses them of being manipulated by the CIA. They have rejected his offer to debate students from the government party. “It is with you, who decides everything in this country, that we want to discuss”, one of the student leaders replied, and another, with typically Venezuelan humor, described a large meeting planned at the university stadium in Caracas as “a get-together of some 40.000 CIA agents”. Vacations start at the end of July, but they will be back at the end of September, if not before, and they will not be alone. Chavez fears a velvet revolution, and he is right to do so.
With the exception of Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador, and Nicaragua, all other governments in the region have unmistakably marked their distance from a government they now clearly perceive as irresponsible and dangerous. Increasingly discredited, probably irreversibly, and not yet in a position of sufficient strength to impose his radical political project without risking his hold on power, a number of analysts has come to the conclusion that Chavez has now engaged in a last, desperate attempt to retain power by bluffing friend and foe into believing that the implementation of his projected Socialism of the XXIst Century is not only inevitable, but will be carried out ruthlessly and at an even faster pace, before his inability to do so at all becomes evident.
In this regard, the reform of the Constitution, which had been postponed by Chavez until 2008, is now to be submitted to the National Assembly for discussion in the second half of this month of July. A 400-page blueprint leaked to the press confirms the intention to turn Venezuela into a centralized state with strong marxist overtones, in which governors and mayors would no longer be elected but appointed by the President, private property would be severely limited, mainly to personal use, and means of production - if in addition a law proposed by the deputies of the Communist Party is approved - effectively run by Management Committees made up of the workers. In parallel, the government has announced that the free exercise of liberal professions will be regulated in order to serve the revolution, and that it also intends to establish a national transportation company that will compete with the large private transportation system. Architects, engineers and doctors, as well as bus and truck owners and drivers have started to join the student and journalist marches.
Chavez’ continues to accumulate mistakes, the consequence of his impulsive nature and an often simplistic approach to the complexities of global power relations, but also of desperation in the face of failure, both domestically and internationally. Not only has he not delivered on the expectations for security and economic wellbeing he has generated among the poor, but he has underestimated the ability of his subordinates, such as the Minister of Defense, to effectively align their institutions with the content and pace of the radical changes he intends to impose on the country. L’intendence ne suit pas. Two extremely candid interviews given to the press by General Alberto Muller Rojas, until a week ago the Chief of the Presidential Office for Military Affairs and one of the main organizers of the new Unified Socialist Party, shed light on tensions within the regime.
The General, a self-described “socialist, but not a chavista”, had criticized that, following the US model, the Armed Forces were being kept as a small professional force with much fire power, when what was needed, according to him, was a popular army – el pueblo en armas - able to fight a long, drawn-out war with an invading US army. The General also confirmed that most officers were “not of the Left”, that the President was surrounded by a small coterie of subservient acolytes and had lost touch with reality, that he personally had not met with him since the beginning of the year, and topping off the interview by calling the President “immature”. Chavez often humiliates, even in public, those that are closest to him, and this might be another case of sour grapes, but the interviews clearly rocked the establishment. General Baduel, the Minister of Defense, and the commanders of the Army, Navy, Air Force and National Guard have been dismissed without explanation, to be substituted by ideologically correct officers. Baduel, a true professional, was one of Chavez closest friends and an ally of the first hour. He may be back sooner than Chavez thinks, and in a very different capacity.
Having forced PDVSA into total submission, Chavez established last month a Central Planning Commission, chaired by the Vice President and including the ministers of Planning, Energy, Labor, Finance, Agriculture and four others, giving it the mandate to “elaborate the socialist model”. The commission is an important further step in centralizing all power in the Presidency by putting the 204 formerly autonomous state institutes (legally attached to the ministries but with a large measure of autonomy in the design of policies and the execution of their budgets) firmly within the hierarchic pyramid that has Chavez at its top, all under the guise of the Socialism of the XXIst Century. Ranging from the immensely important Corporacion Venezolana de Guayana, the holding company of state enterprises in iron ore and bauxite mining, alumina and aluminum smelters, hydro-power generation and telecommunications south of the Orinoco, to the small National Film Library and the Maiquetia International Airport, exercising any measure of control over all of them will inevitably lead to a deepening of the much by Chavez decried bureaucratization. But then this is a dogmatic revolution run by political activists, not managers.
Withdrawing Venezuela from the Andean Community in a huff after the Peruvian and Colombian negotiations with the US showed promise of bilateral trade agreements was not a good idea, not even from Chavez’ own power perspective, as with the later Correa victory in Ecuador it would have given him a 3 to 2 majority. Now Chavez’ remark that the Brazilian senators were “parrots on the empire”, after they passed a resolution calling for the reversal of the closure of RCTV, has probably ensured that Brazil will not ratify the treaty incorporating Venezuela into Mercosur. Adding insult to injury, he stated in reply to a host of negative official and private sector statements in Brazil, that he was allowing three months for the admission process to be completed, after which he would withdraw Venezuela’s application. This has probably closed any possibility of further consideration of the question by the Brazilian senate, as bitter denunciations of “unacceptable deadlines” and “blackmail” arose in Brasilia and Sao Paolo, where the issue has now become one of principle. There are, naturally, also growing doubts in Brazil on the wisdom of admitting a government that has stated its intention to fundamentally change the organization it wants to join in order to transform it into a vehicle of its own radical, mainly anti US worldview.
Chavez has started to pay the political and diplomatic price for his radical project and outrageous behavior, and his capacity to learn and take corrective action appears to have suffered as absolute power has evidently impaired his judgment and almost legendary intuition. According to Hinterlaces, the only polling institute with longstanding focus groups in the poorest neighborhoods, almost two thirds of his political base sum up their view of Chavez with the statement “He is not a bad guy, but he’s crazy”. He is increasingly reacting in an arrogant and childish manner and did not, for example, attend the last Mercosur summit at the end of June in Paraguay (another senate that opposes Venezuela’s entry to Mercosur), and in which the agenda centered on energy cooperation, really providing him with an excellent opportunity to repair his self-inflicted damage.
Instead he flew off to Moscow and Minsk, now the main suppliers of the Armed Forces, to buy (officially) between five and nine submarines, including 4 of the sophisticated Amur class, but probably also more Sukhoi 30’s (the number of which is to be doubled to 56), as well as additional attack helicopters. But also in Moscow he got the could shoulder from President Putin, with whom he only had a short meeting and an invitation to the horse track. His request to address the Duma, put forward by the Communist Party, was unsurprisingly denied by the governing coalition parties after he publicly lamented the disappearance of the Soviet Union. The last leg of his trip was Teheran, where he can always count on President Ahmadinejad to receive him as “a brother” and where, as usual, he initialed some 15 cooperation agreements. However, his growing international isolation is becoming very visible, and the times when the President of France would receive him on a day’s notice are long gone.
Chavez’ haughty position on the admission into Mercosur, as well as his previous threat to withdraw from the OAS if it continued meddling in what he calls “internal and sovereign affairs”, also reflects his longstanding conviction that none of his neighbors, indeed the world, can do without Venezuela’s oil supplies and large reserves. In the long term he is certainly right, but at this time, with public finances out of control and having spent or otherwise compromised his own large pool of money, he might soon discover, if he has not already, that he cannot do without their investments in developing new oil production capacity, nor without their markets. Indeed, a study by Ramon Espinasa, formerly the head of PDVSA’s department for strategic planning and now with the World Bank, shows that as a result of falling production - a consequence of insufficient investment - and exploding internal consumption, Venezuela’s oil income is likely to be halved before the end of 2008. The International Energy Agency warned two days ago that almost all oil producing nations are facing very similar situations, and that prices are bound to increase dramatically in about five years. Lead times for new oil projects in the Orinoco heavy oil belt also run from 5 to 7 years, and not even if the massive investments to significantly increase production and income in a sustainable manner were made immediately could this downturn be reversed in time to satisfy the huge expectations he has generated with the poor.
The student movement, as Chavez himself explained at a press conference with foreign correspondents, has indeed ignited a long fuse that is catalyzing opposition sentiment into action. University authorities and the Catholic Church have unmistakably endorsed it in clear and urgent terms, and a “last chance” feeling is taking hold. Having lost his democratic credentials and with all these very black clouds on the horizon, why not use his present still very strong position and go for broke? Easier said than done, as it is very difficult to violently repress a peaceful movement demanding national reconciliation. Chavez must know that he no longer has the majority of his countrymen on his side, and that he cannot even count on the unswerving loyalty of those closest to him. Indeed, he would run a very high risk of losing power if he were to pursue a repressive course in order to force his Marxist project on the country. He also knows that returning to a truly democratic form of government is no longer in the cards, as he has become a prisoner of his own discourse. Damned if he does and probably also damned if he doesn’t, Chavez appears to have run out of options. The King is naked, and it seems that he will not be able to carry out his revolution. Not even on paper.